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Governments request data and by doing so attempt to interfere with privacy. 
Unless they can provide a sufficient legal basis, companies will repel these 
requests. Companies also disclose who makes requests how often and on how 
many accounts they request data. More importantly they also publish how 
often these requests result in the disclosure of user data to governments. But 
who are these governments and what is their position when it comes to 
privacy on the internet? To find that out, data from the annual Freedom on 
the Net report is combined with the transparency reports by the most relevant 
tech companies worldwide to provide an overview and attempt to discover a 
connection between the Internet Freedom status of countries and their 
requests to companies about user data. The analysis shows that while 
countries with a worse Internet freedom score violate user right more often 
they not necessarily do so through formal requests and probably get their 
data elsewhere. On the other hand, many governments of freer countries 
willingly engage in the opportunity to legitimize their interferences with user 
privacy and are successful in doing so as many of their requests get answered. 
While the research question can ultimately be affirmed it’s answer and the 
analysis itself give rise to a range of questions on the wider topic of online 






„Anna McDoogles: ‚Hi!‘ 
Mark Bellison:  ‚Hi!‘ 
Anna McDoogles:  ‘You’re early. I was just masturbating’ 
Mark Bellison:  ‘That makes me think of your vagina. I’m Mark. How are you?’ 
Anna McDoogles: ‘A little frustrated at the moment. Also, equally depressed and 
pessimistic about our date tonight.’” 
 
(The invention of lying 2009: 2:12-2:48) 
 
This dialogue, of limited finesse, takes place between two characters at the 
beginning of the 2009 comedy The Invention of Lying directed by Ricky Gervais, 
when they first meet for a date. While the main premise of the movie isn’t 
about not having any privacy but that the people in it are unable to lie, it 
still helps to bring across a point, essential to any paper about privacy and 
more so to a paper about privacy online. One might now wonder what bad 
dates and masturbation habits have to do with a scientific text on online 
privacy. 
The answer is: Countering the “nothing to hide” argument right from the start. 
Fortunately, this is exactly what Daniel J. Solove must have thought when 
publishing an article on the topic in 2011, matching the theme of his book 
“Nothing to Hide” (see: Solove 2011). The notion that “privacy only aids 
wrongdoers” (Schneier 2015: 92) is used by many people to explain why they 
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don’t care about the privacy of others or their own. Even if the people claiming 
to be open books have no real secrets, which according to Solove is unlikely, 
there are still situations where they most likely wouldn’t want to share certain 
information with others. His examples include that many people wouldn’t share 
their credit-card bills or agree to have their naked picture taken and shown 
to their friends and that many people use curtains (Solove 2011: 2). The latter 
is probably because the idea of other people, being able to observe oneself 
at any time and without one’s knowledge, is at the very least uncanny. 
The quote at the beginning of this introduction shows that a situation can 
get very awkward if even the most mundane little truths are unwillingly 
disclosed. Especially so if these truths do not relate to external factors but 
to one’s opinions or beliefs that were rather kept private. In the case of the 
movie characters the situation is their natural state and therefore they are 
probably used to it, but to most people the idea of getting in a similar 
situation, deprived of the possibility to conceal private thoughts and opinions, 
is most likely more than appalling. 
 
These examples, however, all relate to real life but as this paper has the topic 
of online privacy it takes things a little further, not only in terms of a 
provocative start. But what counts as private? Chapter 1 will settle on a 
definition of privacy and of what information is private. Privacy will be 
established as a human right that is worth protecting. More importantly it will 
also be determined that, and under which circumstances the right to privacy 
can legitimately interfered with by governments. 
Dystopian fantasies such as George Orwell’s 1984 or Dave Eggers the Circle 
present situations similar but less humorous than the scene from The Invention 
of Lying with the decisive difference being, that in their universes the people’s 
lack of control over their own privacy is not caused by a state of nature but 
by technology. As technology in our world evolves more and more, seemingly 
catching up to science fiction with dreams of the past such as self-driving 
cars and artificial intelligence now becoming available to customers across 
the world, information collection too has evolved with private information being 
gathered from seemingly harmless data with sometimes striking accuracy. The 
second chapter will deal with online privacy and give insight into the 
technological process of how data is collected and interpreted and why 
companies and governments have an interest in private user data. 
The theoretical part of this paper, consisting of Chapters one and two serves 
mainly to give an overview as to what privacy is and why it matters. The 
empirical part draws on the learning from previous chapters and tries to 
answer to the following research question and generate new insights by 
combining data Internet freedom by country from the Freedom on the Net 
(FOTN) report with data from different company transparency reports on 
requests for user data by governments: 
 
Does the Internet freedom status of countries correlate with the frequency 
and success of their governments engaging in formal user data requests to 
private companies? 
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There are different reasons why this question is worth asking: 
  
Firstly, for years a growing number of companies has regularly published data 
on the requests for user data they have gotten from governments (Accessnow 
2017). Still, no systematic analysis of such reports has been done.  
Secondly, the yearly FOTN reports evaluate the situation on the internet in 
different countries and score their Internet freedom according to different 
categories, one of which primarily deals with privacy (FOTN 2017). While the 
FOTN reports have drawn on transparency reports in the past they only did 
so regarding content removal requests but have neglected requests for user 
data.  
Thirdly, the Internet Freedom ratings, that are based on qualitative source 
material, with quantitative data on user requests can lead to new insights on 
the motivations of the governments that request user data and whether these 
motivations determine how successful they are in doing so. The data sets 
themselves cover a majority of the word population and a majority of typical 
user online behaviour worldwide, thus possibly allowing the perception of global 
trends regarding the relationship between companies and governments on the 
topic of user data disclosure. To answer the research question two hypotheses 
will be phrased: 
 
H1: The governments of countries that have a less free internet according to the 
Freedom on the Net report, request user data from private companies more frequently. 
 
H2: The governments of countries that have a freer Internet according to the Freedom 
on the Net report, get their requests to private companies for user data granted more 
frequently. 
 
An affirmation of the research question based on the validation of these 
hypotheses through the analysis would give rise to a new inquiry. As this 
paper is limited in its extent the question of causality will be left untouched 
until further and more detailed research is done. 
Before a cross data analysis can take place, the first empirical part of the 
paper deals with the outlining of the data that is later used. In Chapter 3 the 
Freedom on the Net report 2016 and its ratings of the Internet freedom in 
65 are presented and evaluated. Data from 2016 is used as the companies 
whose transparency reports are processed in the analysis had not yet 
published their data for all of 2017 at the time of writing. Apple, Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft and Twitter are outlined as the companies that best 
represent the worldwide average online behaviour and where government 
request data is available. Another task undertaken in the third chapter, is to 
harmonize the data of the transparency reports. This is done by combining 
the data from all five companies allowing for a broader perception of the 
facts and thus more meaningful conclusions. Methodology as well as some 
particularities and limits of the data are also addressed in chapter three. The 
last chapter deals with the hypotheses that are made and based on the 
information presented in previous chapters. Following the combined analysis 
and discussion of the data, the learnings, limits and potential benefits from 
this paper are presented in the conclusion. 




Chapter 1: Privacy in Real Life 
The following chapter aims to convey an understanding of what the right to privacy is and by 
exploring different definitions and examples, showing what role, it can play in the lives of 
people. Furthermore, it is established why privacy cannot be unconditional, how is protected 
and what exactly can be regarded as private. Finally, a definition to be used for the rest of 




Privacy is About control 
 
In ancient Greece the concept of a distinction between private and public life 
already existed. In their works, both Socrates and Aristotle attributed relevancy 
to the distinction between the political (public) and the private (Moore 2013: 
1). Just as good and bad, darkness and light or old and new, the concept of 
privacy or private life only works when opposed to publicity or public life, 
meaning that there can only be private information if public information exists 
as well. 
 
Evidently all information becomes somewhat public as soon as is it shared 
with others. Is should be pointed out, that publicity is not an absolute. For 
example, sharing one’s personal phone number with a new acquaintance 
doesn’t mean that the phone number should also be known by advertising 
company. This follows Parent’s Definition of privacy, stating that “privacy is 
the condition of not having undocumented knowledge about oneself possessed 
by others” (1983: 269). 
 
The creation of publicity is not always an active process and it can be difficult 
to keep track of what knowledge about oneself is shared with others. Mundane 
actions as going for an ice cream in the park, mean that basic elements of 
identity are automatically shared with everyone one might cross or interact 
with (Lessig 2006: 39). Unless going through great lengths it is nearly 
impossible to venture among other people, making the following information 
about oneself public: 
 
- approximate age 
- sex 
- skin colour 
- height and physique 
- health status, if one sneezes for example 
 
Once arrived at the ice cream stand, to get an ice cream, again, one must 
disclose further information to the people around. This information is now 
disclosed voluntarily as one expects something in return: 
 
- All the above 
- That one is in possession of money 
- The location of one’s money or credit card 
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- The flavour of ice cream one likes 
- That one is or is not lactose intolerant (unless vegan is an option) 
- Whether one is a cup or a cone person 
- The sound of one’s voice 
- One’s general mood 
 
The above list is incomplete and there is a plethora of other information that 
is revealed in such a simple process. Much of the information disclosed in 
daily life is automatically shared reciprocally, meaning that while a person 
shares information on their identity, they are also able to collect similar 
information about others. Thus, a certain balance is created based on the 
silent agreement that information is shared when venturing among others. 
 
Consciously and unconsciously, people control the information flow towards 
others, thus creating privacy (Westin 1967: 9). This can be achieved by 
disclosing or secluding information from others. One might want to keep a 
controversial hobby from superiors at work, on the other hand, this same 
person might tell their date about it, to assess whether they both share the 
same interests. Most information is inherently open to interpretation as well 
as misinterpretation, which is why people constantly try to influence it (Gross: 
1971: 209). A woman wearing makeup and high heels might want to look 
younger and more attractive than she is, while a man wearing what looks like 
an expensive watch, might do so to show that he has achieved something 
and that he can provide for others. They both control what information about 
them is known to others. 
 
Privacy on a matter can only be achieved by actively keeping certain 
information from others. Posner sees it as the “right to conceal discreditable 
facts about oneself” (1981: 46), essentially defining privacy as a right to 
secrecy. Inness on the other hand, also sees privacy as a form of control, 
but rather than negative things the focus of her definition lies on the things 
that matter to the individual on an emotional level (1992: 91), a more neutral 




Privacy is not About Control at Any Cost 
 
Like the ancient Greek philosophers, John Stuart Mill also made the distinction 
between private life and public life. For him “The only purpose for which power 
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against 
his will, is to prevent harm to others” (1978: 9). Everything that went beyond 
this scope could therefore be viewed as an unrightfully exercise of power. A 
problem clearly occurs with this depiction of legitimate and illegitimate as 
soon as the point of view is changed. What might be considered as legitimate 
harm prevention by one, might be considered as an illegitimate cause of harm 
to another. 
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Mill further points out, that harm could not only occur by active behaviour, 
but both by “doing and allowing” (Moore 2013: 3). One can do harm or allow 
harm and one can do good or allow good. This also is true for a governments 
behaviour towards privacy: 
 
Allowing harm to privacy: 
A situation where privacy is or can be violated or violation is facilitated is 
neglected by the government. 
 
Doing harm to privacy: 
A situation where privacy is or can be violated or violation facilitated is 
created by the government. 
 
Allowing good for privacy: 
The government doesn’t take steps to strengthen privacy, but it does not 
prevent efforts by others. 
 
Doing good for privacy: 
A situation where privacy is or can be violated or violation facilitated is tackled 
by the government. 
 
John Locke wanted to secure the rights to property, to life and liberty and 
to do so, he was ready to subjugate to a set of rules enforced by the 
government (Locke 1980: 5-30). Like Mill, everything that did not help the 
protection of those rights, meant that whatever happened behind closed doors 
not threatening the rights of any individual, would not fall under the jurisdiction 
of government. 
 
In conclusion, if a government or any other entity would interfere, passively 
or actively, with said actions behind closed doors without a legitimate reason, 
such action or inaction could be considered as a violation of privacy. This 
has been understood by many. So many that the most basic instance of 
privacy law can be found in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), ratified on December 10th, 1948. It states that: 
 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks” 
 
The issue of validity and the issue of justification are two problems the UDHR 
is facing when it comes to the protection of individual human rights. As its 
name states, the UDHR demands to be universally valid. It is not, as many 
people and even whole governments may strongly oppose individual human 
right claims (GCC 2016: 36). However, the UDHR has since its adoption partially 
transited into customary international law and has in many countries been 
adapted into binding national law. In countries or regions where it hasn’t it is 
to be a model (GCC 2016: 34). As the UDHR was not phrased to be a fixed 
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set of rules but “living document” it is not supposed to settle all the issues 
but asks for renewed attention as the world changes (GCC 2016: 14). 
 
Drawing from the UDHR two kinds of interference with privacy can be deducted 
from article 12. The word “arbitrary” suggests that an interference with the 
right to privacy is only problematic if it takes place without a fixed set of 
rules, suggesting that any interference with privacy backed by some form of 
legal framework, might be justified and therefore not viewed as a violation. 
For countries that have adopted national legislation aiming for the protection 
of privacy in their national legislation, the phrasing issue should prove to be 
less problematic as in countries that haven’t. 
 
Some interferences with privacy are sure not to be controversial, one being 
the prosecution of crime. Following a crime, it is imperative for law enforcement 
to get their hands on Information which can be used to identify the offender, 
and that to do so a suspect’s privacy might be interfered with seems entirely 
justifiable. 
 
Legally rooted measures 
If an individual’s privacy is interfered with by another entity this is not a 
violation of the right to privacy, so long as the reason for the interference is 
grounded by law in the country where a person is staying. If for instance a 
citizen of a country with strong privacy laws travelled to a country with very 
weak ones, the traveller will have to submit to his privacy being interfered 
with in a way that would not be allowed in his home country. As mentioned 
above, views differ from country to country, but a government has authority 
over its territory as well as behaviour taking place within it. Governments limit 
themselves through law, so if a privacy violation would be in conflict to other 
superior law the country has submitted to, it could be challenged. This could 
be the case if privacy is protected in the constitution or if the government 
has agreed to respect international standards such as the UDHC. In liberal 
democracies privacy must for instance, be a central part of the political system 
as the secrecy of the vote is vital to the concept of the leaders being elected 
according to the peoples will (Moore 2013: 9). 
 
Not legally rooted measures 
In accordance with the Art. 12 of the UDHC, any interference with privacy that 
is not somehow legally rooted can be challenged as a violation (Morinsk 1999: 
138-142). While it is safe to say that some concepts such as the assassination 
of a political figure, child molestation or harmful hacking, can be considered 
a crime virtually everywhere, on other offences views may once again, strongly 
differ. 
 
As many different countries with sometimes strongly differing world views will 
be scrutinized in the upcoming analysis, it would not be proper to deliberate 
what kind of specific behaviour should be considered as legitimate or 
illegitimate. Taking the side of privacy as a right worth protecting, but not 
under every circumstance, the analysis will only focus on looking at whether 
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steps to interfere with privacy have been taken or not. An assessment of the 





Personally Identifiable Information as a Means to Make Privacy 
Tangible 
 
After grasping different definitions and views on privacy the question remains: 
What counts as private and what counts as public? Moore’s definition of 
privacy, summarizing it as “the right to control access to and uses of personal 
information and spatial locations” (2013: 5), seems to most fit the concept 
as it combines the different approaches proposed above. Whereas a 
differentiation between personal information and spatial location might make 
more sense in the real space, in the digital world there is only one point of 
access revealing all that can be revealed, namely the device one uses to 
access the net. As chapter 2 will show, today this most likely also includes 
location. The introduction of the concept of personally identifiable information 
(PII) can help to understand what counts as private and what as public. 
 
There is however no general legal definition as of what Information exactly 
can be regarded as PII (Schwartz / Solove 2011: 1893). U.S. legislation often 
follows what is called a reductionist approach, meaning that its privacy 
regulations mostly focus on PII as enabling already identified individuals to be 
identified through that information (Schwartz / Solove 2011: 1873). 
This neglects the aspect of identifiable information, namely information that 
does not refer to a person that is already identified but makes an unidentified 
person potentially identifiable. This so-called expansionist approach can be 
found in privacy legislation of the European Union (Schwartz / Solove 2011: 
1874). 
Schwartz and Solove go on to propose a definition of PII that expands on 
both the reductionist and expansionist approach, calling it PII 2.0. PII 2.0 covers 
“information [that] can be about an (1) identified, (2) identifiable, or (3) non-
identifiable person.” (Schwartz / Solove 2011: 1874). Together with an 
understanding of privacy according to Moore’s definition, PII can be understood 
as information that can facilitate the process of finding out an individual’s 
identity or trace them (Stevens 2012: 6). If this definition seems rather broad 
that is because it is meant to be. As will be shown in the next chapter almost 
everything and unlikely data even more can be or become PII and should 




Learnings of Chapter 1: Privacy in Real Life 
 
Since the ancient times there has been a distinction between public life and 
private life, a life hidden from the gaze of others. However nearly everything 
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and even the most mundane actions of daily life produce data that is open 
to scrutiny and interpretation by others. The right to privacy itself can be 
understood as the right to have control over personally identifiable information, 
data that can potentially be used to identify and track one down. Data 
produced in daily life can be collected, interpreted and potentially be used if 
people decide to look at it. Following the arguments of Mill and Locke, it can 
be understood that the right to privacy is worthy of protection but not at any 
cost. As the rights of others might be harmed from an unconditional right to 
secrecy the decision as to when one’s privacy could be breached was put in 
the hands of governments. International law requires that interference with 










































Chapter 2: Privacy on the Internet 
This chapter deals with privacy on the Internet and how every movement of a user can be 
tracked. Showing that technology is now able to accurately guess Information that users 
haven’t actively decided to disclose and sometimes even wanted to keep secret, illustrates 
why privacy online is just as important as privacy in real life. The second part explores why 




Same but Different and Why That Matters 
 
While privacy has been established as a relevant topic for the real space it 
is so in the digital space as well, as the technological ability to intrude in 
privacy has changed (Moore 2013: 9). The Internet as a global Information 
Network is changing. Changing from an anarchic space to a more regulable 
space (Lessig 2006: 200). It has been noted that the sharp rise in surveillance 
of digital communication asks for new elaborations as not only privacy is 
being threatened but also puts the freedoms of expression, of association and 
assembly at risk as well as groups of people such as journalists, activists, 
minorities and government critics, as their work also takes place in the digital 
world (CGG 2016: 52). It should be added that as technological progress 
advances in a seemingly unstoppable fashion more and more Information from 
real life becomes digitalized. As examples smartphones, cloud storage and 
more recently the Internet of Things (IoT) come to mind. As the lines between 
real and digital life get increasingly blurred it can be concluded that privacy 
laws should be effective in the real space and cyberspace alike. Whether they 
actually are nationally is not covered by the scope of this paper. Every time 
a user visits a website or uses an application linked to online services, private 
information, just like in real life, is disclosed. 
 
“Everything you do on the Net produces data. That data is, in aggregate, 
extremely valuable, more valuable to commerce than it is to the government. 
The government (in normal times) really cares only that you obey some select 
set of laws. But commerce is keen to figure out how you want to spend your 
money, and data does that. With massive amounts of data about what you 
do and what you say, it becomes increasingly possible to market to you in a 
direct and effective way.” (Lessig 2006: 216) 
 
Many people believe that they are anonymous on the Internet, if they do not 
act under their real names. This false assumption has been named the 
Anonymity Myth, as every device accessing the Internet can be tracked. 
(Schwartz / Solove 2011: 1837). The first tool to track activity online is the 
so-called Internet protocol (IP) address. It is a unique number assigned to 
every device accessing the Internet. As it doesn’t identify a person but only a 
device, companies have tried to argue that the IP does not count as personally 
identifiable information (Schwartz / Solove 2011: 1838). By the definition of 
PII used in this paper, it is, because it can be used together with other 
information to identify one person. The further technical process of how people 
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can be tracked online is not relevant, it suffices to say that everything people 





Data Collection and Interpretation 
 
To get a better grasp of what can be and is tracked every person using an 
Internet browser today, be it on a mobile or a desktop device, can find out 
what data the websites they visit can collect on them. The Application webkay 
(webkay.robinlinus.com) for example, visualizes what data every website can 
potentially know about its users. The tool works in a very simple way. It is 
just a website showing all the information it can get about its current visitor. 
Information presented by this tool is to be viewed as an educated guess, 
according to the creator, however everyone can check for themselves whether 
their data is presented accurately. The following information can potentially 
be collected and used. 
 
- Approximate location (coordinates, address, languages spoken at 
location, local time) 
- Software used (operating system, browser, browser plugins) 
- Hardware used (Display resolution, number of CPU cores, GPU model, 
device battery status) 
- Connection (Local- and public IP address, service provider, connection 
speeds) 
- Social media log in status 
- Misuse clicks and auto- fill for phishing (the website can potentially 
exploit social media accounts of the user) 
- Gyroscope orientation (only on mobile devices) 
- Scan the local network for other devices 
 
Whereas this information still doesn’t pinpoint a certain person, implications 
about the person in front of the screen are made possible, and thus also the 
target marketing mentioned by Lessig. By the definition used in this paper 
most if not all of this information is potentially PII. 
 
Depending on the type of service used, information like browsing history, 
contacts, appearance, for example when granting access to the camera, as 
well as user provided details, meaning everything the user inputs while using 
a service, might be collected (Kishore 2012). 
 
Things however go further, with data not only being collected but also analysed 
and interpreted. The desktop web browser extension Dataselfie can be used 
to visualize that digital user generated data, just as data in real life is prone 
to interpretation and thus to the disclosure of information the user might not 
initially agree to disclose. Once installed and linked to a user’s Facebook 
account, the application uses different machine learning algorithms and 
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application programming interfaces (API’s) to predict the user’s personality 
based on their interests in combination with the aforementioned user provided 
details, namely the users behaviour on the social network (Thi Duc / Flores 
Mir 2017). The explanation of what Dataselfie does exactly, is best left to the 
application itself: 
 
“The extension tracks: clicks on likes in your newsfeed, clicks on 
newsfeed links to external sites, duration spent on different posts 
and the specifics of those posts (authors, images and text) in your 
newsfeed, anything you type, and time spent on Facebook overall.” 
(Dataselfie FAQ) 
 
After gathering data from a few days of use, the tracking allows the extension 
to create a digital output that makes data based assumptions on the following 
traits of the user: 
 
- Top ten friends 
- Top ten interests 
- Keyword sentiment analysis 
- Entity sentiment analysis 
- Personality prediction 
- Religious and political orientation 
- Political orientation 
- Shopping preferences 
- Health, activities and other preferences 
- Intelligence, life satisfaction, psychological gender and leadership 
qualities 
 
While this example didn’t use PII to identify a person, it self-generated critical 
PII by linking it to an already identified person. This shows how “Computer 
scientists are finding ever more inventive ways to combine various pieces of 
non-PII to make them PII.” (Schwartz / Solove 2011: 1841) 
 
The more data is collected the more accurate the results become. Just like 
in real life interpretation is prone to mistakes. This digital method is too. Still, 
the accuracy of such Facebook data analysis has already successfully been 
researched, showing that even sensitive information a user might have decided 
not to disclose, can be accurately guessed based on their interests (see 
Kosinski et al. 2013). This means that as opposed to real life that is spatially 
and sensory limited, on the Internet the user cannot really know and control 
what data is collected on him and what happens with it. As previously 
established, any action, and more so the actions online, leave behind 
information. And as much of this information can be used, misused and is 
even open to interpretation it becomes increasingly difficult for the individual 
to control who knows what. 
 
However not all data collection interferes with the right to Privacy. The Internet 
can be divided into two spaces. The Clear Net or public domain can be 
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understood as the part of the Internet that is fully accessible to anyone using 
a search engine (Bergman 2001). Many Blogs (also political), news websites 
and forums fall under this aspect, while everything that is inherently hidden 
from the public eye because it is behind a password, such As E-Mails, Private 
Messages or closed message boards can be seen as private domain or part 
of the Deep Web (Bergman 2001). To engage in data collection from the 




Data Processing by Companies 
 
Companies can simply ask the user for permission to collect their data. Online 
Cookies (see Palmer 2005), that now must be accepted on nearly every first 
time visit to a website, are one way the user gives his permission for data 
collection. The Terms and Conditions one must agree to when signing up for 
new accounts determine what data can be collected by companies and what 
they can do with it (DeNardis /Hackl 2015: 3-4). 
 
One might now wonder what happens to all the data that can be collected. 
In short: It helps companies make more money more efficiently just as it was 
noted in the Lessig quote above (2006: 206). Target advertising allows to 
generate much higher conversion rates than conventional advertising (Caudill 
/ Murphy 2000: 13-14) and if companies use private data to offer tailor made 
services, users will be more attracted to the services that fit better to their 
needs. This seems like a win-win situation as companies can make ever more 
money and to do so, they invest in providing always better services the user 
can use seemingly free of charge. As services like google have become 
ubiquitous in private life and business it becomes increasingly difficult for 
users to opt out. While using an alternative and arguably worse search engine 
might still be manageable evading data collection altogether can be hard as 
an example shall shortly demonstrate. 
 
There is even potential for trouble if data is unintentionally or even incorrect 
data disclosed by companies. Kosinski et al. gave the example of an unmarried 
woman whose pregnancy is unwantedly or incorrectly disclosed to her family 
through targeted ads (2013: 5802). In a culture where this is unacceptable 
the disclosure of such information might be fatal. 
Sociologist Janet Vertesi made exactly that experiment, hiding her pregnancy 
from the prying eyes of big data. Her decision to limit the information she 
was giving to Internet companies, is perfectly in line with the notion the right 
to privacy as a form of control about private information. Later she wrote an 
article depicting how “opting out [of big data] is not only antisocial, but it 
can appear criminal” (2014) as she couldn’t talk about the pregnancy anywhere 
on social media, including private messages, had to withdraw large amounts 
of cash for the baby shopping and used special software to evade tracking 
while doing research on names. 
Online Privacy and Public Policy   Raphael von Aulock 
14 
 
Following her own attempts at keeping her data private, journalist Julia Angwing 
concludes that to evade tracking one must either have vast technological 
knowledge or be very rich (see 2014). Users today don’t seem to really have 
a choice, other than allow the collection and processing of their private data 
if they want to stay fully functional in a society that so heavily relies on the 




Data Processing by Governments 
 
A State, as defined from a constitutional law perspective by Georg Jellinek 
(1900: 394-434), consists of three entities, namely: national territory, national 
population and state authority. The latter is known as government. It is a 
person or group of people; whose basic task is to rule over the national 
population living in the national territory the government holds state authority 
over. More specific tasks and limits of governmental powers can be found in 
national constitutions. The government derives its executive power from being 
the only entity of a nation able to make policies as well as enforce them. 
(Gerching / Kolmar 2014: 2-5). Governments too have increasingly wanted 
their shay and share of information in the world of online data, arguably to 
enforce the laws they have sworn to uphold on the Internet as well. 
 
When reports of arrests and repercussions related to online activity surface, 
in many cases it remains unclear how exactly authorities gained knowledge of 
the reported actions. Oftentimes the alleged offence was carried out by sharing 
or publishing information in the public domain, such as on a website, a blog, 
or by publicly posting or sharing punishable information on public social media 
that can be viewed without an account (such as Twitter). This behaviour cannot 
be an interference with privacy as the alleged perpetrators intentionally shared 
said information in a publicly accessible space. Law enforcement therefore has 
no need to gain access to a space secluded from the public eye. 
 
If governments do however access information that a user did not intentionally 
share in public, this must be regarded as an interference with the right to 
privacy and must therefore be justified. One example are the later analysed 
government requests. The fact alone that governments ask for the data instead 
of just looking it up means that it is most likely data that is not easy to 
access. Their motivations range from “national security, defamation, computer 
fraud and abuse, child protection, or, in some cases, blatant political 
oppression such as identifying dissident media sources” (DeNardis / Hackl 
2015: 6) 
 
In some cases, it is highly disputable whether a certain space is to be regarded 
as public or private space, as in in the case of certain social media posts. 
Publicly posting something on Facebook could be regarded as public speech 
but depending on individual privacy settings such as the “share only with 
friends” option it becomes disputable whether an action falls under privacy or 
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freedom of expression. As one needs an account to see other people’s 
Facebook posts regardless of them being private or public they will herby be 
defined as private and thus needing justification if breached by governments. 
It should be noted though, that legislation varies from country to country. 
India (Hindustan Times 2017) and Germany (Noé 2015) for instance do not 
differentiate between the privacy settings of social media posts. 
 
To collect data, some governments have instated so called online mass 
surveillance programs. The best-known ones are probably the programs by the 
U.S. and U.K. government spy agencies whose practices of mass collecting 
user data, were blown wide open in 2103 following the revelations of whistle-
blower Edward Snowden (Greenwald 2013). 
 
Although the U.S. Government insisted that it was only collecting metadata, 
consisting of times, duration and location of communications (Stanley / Wizner 
2013), instead of contend data. Drawing, yet again, from the previous definition 
of what is private, such information, when interpreted correctly is sure to make 
people identifiable, even if the reductionist approach of the U.S. Government 
doesn’t count it as such. That the data collected by these programs is critical 
regarding the right to privacy is derived from the fact that the governments 
had bypassed the encryption of service providers (Greenwald 2013) 
 
British researcher Kieran Healy showed how metadata could have been used 
by the British in the 18th century (see 2013). Using only Information on what 
societies a set of 254 people were members of, he was able to single out 
Paul Revere, a US freedom fighter that was considered an enemy of the British 
Empire. What would have worked with only one set of information almost three 
hundred years ago shows, that with the help of today’s technology, it would 
be easy to single out a person out of millions with only little more information. 
 
Following the revelations of Edward Snowden, the U.S. National Security Agency 
(NSA) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) of the U.K. 
were incorporated into the 2014 Enemies of the Internet report (Reporters 
without borders 2014) along with other intelligence agencies engaging in 
overeager and questionable surveillance across the world. The following 
countries are home to one or multiple government agencies capable of online 
mass surveillance (Reporters Without Borders 2014): 
Bahrain, Belarus, China, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, North Korea, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
 
No update of the report was published by Reporters Without Borders as a 
request for the latest issue, in January 2018, has brought to light. Since this 
report additional countries have engaged or been found to engage in online 
mass surveillance. Germany recently reformed its Federal Intelligence Service 
law, regulating the Bundesnachrichtendienst (Eng. Federal Intelligence Service), 
and granting it vast online surveillance competences (Krempl 2016). Australia 
gained illegal access to user web browsing histories through service providers. 
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This was publicized in August 2014 (Grubb 2014), a few months after the last 
“Enemies of the Internet” report was published. 
 
According to privacy protection by international law, all the above governments 
engaging in mass surveillance should have a sufficient legal basis to justify 
their behaviour. Whether they do, is not subject of the analysis but that they 
have the capability to engage in surveillance activities could influence how 




Learnings of Chapter 2: Privacy on the Internet 
 
On the Internet, everything one does produce data. The main difference to 
the real world is that online every action also leaves a trace. A trace that 
that isn’t only created if other individuals take interest but a trace that is 
constantly created by the storing of information by companies. A trace that 
is only waiting to be scrutinized and analysed by private companies and 
government agencies alike. While companies have the goal to make more 
money, governments can use data to enforce the rule of law on the Internet 
and real life alike. As the pregnancy example shows, while yet we don’t live 
in a world where we are compelled to tell the truth as everything can be 
known, for the individual it becomes increasingly difficult and depending on 
resources maybe even impossible, to evade the look of big brother. The 
increased connectivity in all life situations means that ever more data is put 
online, and it becomes more and more impossible, to keep track of who 
knows what about oneself. With very little data very much can be found out, 

























Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
 
The Following Chapter is the first empirical part of the paper and serves for setting stage for 
the analysis. By presenting the two main data sets, namely the Freedom on the Net report 
and the aggregate data of relevant transparency reports. The individual analyses explore what 
the data sets have to offer by carving out all the data that will be used in the combined 
analysis. Furthermore, some remarkable aspects of the data will be presented aside from the 
main research question. Methodical aspects and concerns possible as well as possible limits 




The Freedom on the Net Report 2016 
 
First started in 2011, the Freedom on the Net report (FOTN) by U.S. based 
non-government-organization Freedom House has analysed and ranked the 
political situation regarding the Internet in a growing number of countries 
around the globe. FOTN report was funded by the following institutions and 
private interest groups (FOTN 2017): 
 
- U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Human Rights and Labor (DRL) 
- Google 
- Schloss Family Foundation 
- Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
- Facebook 




In 2016, the FOTN report included 65 countries from around the globe. 
Together they are home to 88% of the global Internet population (FOTN 2016: 
32). 65 will also be the baseline of countries analysed. The FOTN reports asks 
a set of questions and sub-questions in every category. Based on the answers 
to individual sub questions points are given (FOTN 2016: 1015-1019). In total, 
these can amount to a score of 100 points with 0 being the best score and 
100 the worst. From a score from 0 to 30, countries are regarded as having 
a “Free” Internet. 31-60 means that a country’s Internet is “Partly Free” and 
everything above that is considered “Not Free” (FOTN 2016: 1013). 
Fig. 1 (see: Appendix) discloses the Ranking of all countries from worst to 
best to give an image of the data being used. As seen in Fig. 1, data will, if 
possible, be colour coded to disclose the Internet freedom status of countries 
at a glance. The results show that 35% of the world Internet population lives 
in countries ranked as “Not Free”, followed by 29% in partly “Partly Free” with 
potentially only a mere 24% of the world’s total online population having 
access to “Free” Internet, as the remaining 12% are not assessed in the 
report (FOTN 2016: 6) 
 
Countries are ranked in three categories: 




Obstacles to Access [Max 25 points]: 
“Details infrastructural and economic barriers to access, legal and ownership 
control over internet service providers, and independence of regulatory bodies” 
(FOTN 2016: 1013) 
 
Limits on Content [Max. 35 points]: 
“Analyzes legal regulations on content, technical filtering and blocking of 
websites, self-censorship, the vibrancy and diversity of online news media, and 
the use of digital tools for civic mobilization” (FOTN 2016: 1013) 
 
Violations of User Rights [Max. 40 points]: 
“Tackles surveillance, privacy, and repercussions for online speech and 
activities, such as imprisonment, extralegal harassment, or cyberattacks.” (FOTN 
2016: 1013) 
 
The FOTN report has excluded "legislation addressing harmful content" (FOTN 
2016: 1018) from the “Violation of User Rights” category giving the examples 
of child pornography and malicious hacking. As this concerns only a sub 
question of the “Violations of User Rights” category the effects of this 
exception on the total score are limited. The implications however are further 
reaching, as the exclusion is not unconditional but selective. 
The examples given in the report suggest that only internationally acceptable 
legislation has no effect on the score as the example of homosexuality shows. 
In Tunisia homosexuality is illegal (Code Pénal [Penal Code of Tunisia 2005]: 
Art. 230) and the ban enforced (FOTN 2016: 824), while in Russia the online 
distribution of “homosexual propaganda” on social media has been punished 
(FOTN 2016: 683). In the Netherlands for instance, the exact opposite is the 
case, the defamation of homosexuality is illegal and can be punished with up 
to a year in prison (Criminal Code [of the Netherlands] 2012: Art. 137c). No 
case of prosecution could be found which might be why this legislation is not 
in the report. 
Still, it demonstrates that homosexuality is a disputable topic, as the stance 
towards it can vary between nations. Although the Officials in Tunisia and 
Russia were acting in accordance with local law their behaviour has been 
flagged in the report as it is problematic from a global perspective. Because 
such disputable cases were not excluded from the report, it becomes apparent 
that only globally accepted interference with privacy doesn’t influence the final 
score. 
 
Out of the 65 countries studied on the report 24 have restricted social media 
over the course of 2016. Some countries have blocked some services 
temporarily, while others block most of them durably. The services blocked 
include: Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter, YouTube, Telegram, Skype and 
Instagram. 
Whether one or more services were blocked temporarily or permanently cannot 
be taken into consideration, as the exact extent of such blockings is not 
comprehensible in all cases. People can also use circumvention tools to get 
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around the barriers and hide their identity online, thus further blurring the 
validity of the data. As it is evident that if access to services is complicated 
through blockings, users will have to actively override the restrictions and 
possibly go against the law, a decision that is presumably not going to be 
made by 100% of users. Some countries even forbid so called Virtual Private 
Networks (VPN) and put the use under harsh punishment (FOTN 2016: 7). 
While it is likely that blocking has a negative effect on the use of the blocked 
social networks the aforementioned factors limit the potential of social media 
blocking to provide final explanations. Of the countries that block Social media 
a majority is “Not Free” while only two “Free” countries have experienced 
blocking (Fig. 2). 
 

































While “Obstacles to Access” can be seen as the category disclosing a country’s 
general stance towards Internet use by its people (FOTN 2016: 1015-1016), 
the “Limitations on Content” category focuses on censorship efforts (FOTN 
2016: 1016-1018), thus dealing mainly with freedom of expression. They are 
Free (0-30) 
Partly Free (31-60 
Not Free (61-100) 
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both not central to the questions asked but as part of the total score they 
help to give a better image of a country’s overall position on Internet policy. 
“Violations of User Rights” essentially deals with privacy violation, as much of 
the behaviour addressed in the country reports either deals with direct privacy 
interference (FOTN 2016: 1018), or actions taken by the government that 
suggest a preceding interference with privacy, such as arrests following online 
behaviour (FOTN 2016: 1019) for example due to social media posts or private 
messages. Some of the questions asked in the report also deal with 
government behaviour that is passively against privacy, such as a lack of 
adequate protection of the user rights whose violation is addressed in the 




/ /        = “Free”/”Partly Free” country having a higher Violations of user Rights score 
than some  countries that are a rating category higher  
  / /  = country with ”Free”/”Partly Free”/”Not Free” rating 
 
To give a more complete image however, the focus will not lie only on the 
“Violations of user Rights category but the total score will be used for the 
comparison with transparency report data. That this is a reasonable approach 
can be seen in Fig. 3. The number of points in the “Violation of User Rights” 
score with, a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 40, rises proportionally to the 
total score, as the linear trend line shows. This leads to the conclusion that 
countries with a less free Internet are more likely to violate user rights and 








































Total FOTN Score [Max. 100]
Figure 3: Countries by "Violation of User Rights" Score in 
Relation to Total FOTN Score
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overview of global behaviour, the discussion of the data from the combined 
analysis will be limited to the rating categories rather than individual scores. 
For the analysis itself the exact total scores will be used. In the discussion 
“Free” Countries will be expected to be less invasive and “Not Free” ones to 
be more, while “Partly Free” countries are expected to occupy the space in 
between the other categories while some deviations will be accepted. Individual 
“Free” or “Not Free” countries deviating from their expected behaviour will be 
standing out 
Deviation can be understood as being them clearly positioned at the opposite 
side of the average or median respectively, as compared with most of the 
countries in the same rating category. A tolerance of 5% will be applied to 
avoid discussion of countries that are positioned around the average and 
therefore not overly meaningful. 
There are some exceptions however (circled in white) that need to be taken 
into consideration. While It has been established that the score of the category 
rises proportionally to the total score, meaning that “Not Free” countries 
engage more in behaviour interfering with privacy violating behaviour than 
“Free” countries, while “Partly Free” countries are mostly set in between. Things 
can look different however look when the “Violation of User Rights” score is 
looked at in proportion to the total score. 
 
Fig. 4: Countries with the Highest Proportion of Their Total Score Due 






Overall FOTN Score  
[Max. 100] 
Violations of User Rights Score  
[Max. 40] 
Percentage of Total Score 
 
1 United States 18 13 72% 
2 United Kingdom 23 16 70% 
3 Iceland 6 4 67% 
4 France 25 16 64% 
5 Australia 21 13 62% 
6 Italy 25 15 60% 
7 Thailand 66 33 59% 
8 Germany 19 11 58% 
9 Canada 16 9 56% 
10 Brazil 32 17 53% 
…     
19 Japan 22 11 50% 
- Average 46,6 21,5 48% 
37 China 88 40 45% 
…     








Partly Free (31-60 
Not Free (61-100) 
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Of the countries with the highest proportion of their total score coming from 
user right violations 8 out of 10 have been classified as “Free” and of the 
total 17 “Free” countries covered in the report, ten lie above the general 
average of 48%. Of these the lowest ranking country is Japan. Still, 50% of 
its total score comes from user right violations. While it must be mentioned 
that with a Maximum of 40 points the “Violation of User Rights” category is 
the strongest of the three, this is equal to all countries and as China 
demonstrates, ranking at 36th while maxing out on user violation, a below 
average proportion of the total score stemming from user rights violation is 
possible with enough points in the other two categories. This leads to 
conclusion that while “Free” countries overall have more favourable policies 
and practices regarding the internet Internet, their negative aspects are more 
likely to be focused on user rights. This doesn’t have much impact as the 
score of these free countries is still lower than the scores of the countries in 
a worse rating category. The exceptions are the following: 
 
The U.K.   is rated higher than Malawi, Kyrgyzstan and Colombia 
France  is rated higher than Malawi, Kyrgyzstan and Colombia 
Italy   is rated higher than Malawi and Kyrgyzstan 
Bangladesh  is rated higher than Kazakhstan, Turkey, Gambia and Myanmar 
 
Should unexpected behaviour occur with these countries during the analysis, 
the higher score of the U.K. France and Bangladesh countries might explain 
it, however only if anomalies occur in relation to the countries they are higher 
rated as. As the differences are slight the impact might still be questioned 
but as the individual country reports only disclose the total score in every 
category, individual statements in the reports cannot clearly be associated to 
an individual sub question. Therefore, these slight differences might exactly 





Transparency Report Selection 
 
Transparency reports have first been released in 2010, with the first one being 
published by Google. Since then 68 companies worldwide have been disclosing 
how often they get requests for data disclosure from governments (Accessnow 
2017). In transparency reports companies disclose who they have gotten 
requests from. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the governments of 
countries that do not show up in the report have not issued any requests. 
To best cover the global Internet population as well as use cases in which 
data is produced, the biggest companies in five categories are devised to 
accurately mirror average online behaviour. Referring to a 2011 study on the 
most popular activities online (Purcell 2011: 2) they should be: 
 
- Send or read email 
- Use a search engine 
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- Get news online 
- Buy a product online 
- Social network sites 
 
As no recent studies are available on online behaviour, a crucial aspect of 
today’s online behaviour has been left out. Internet access through mobile 
devices has been rising over the past years and globally surpassed Internet 
usage via desktop in late 2016 (StatCounter 2016). To better mirror these 
recent developments the “Send or read email” category will be changed 
“Messaging”. 
Another issue arises with the category “Get news online” as it has been found 
that today people of all demographics in the United Kingdom (Kleis Nielsen 
2016) and the U.S (Gottfried /Shaerer 2016: 2) get much and sometimes most 
of their online news from social media. It might be problematic to draw global 
conclusions from this behaviour but as many of the world’s most influential 
technology companies come from the U.S., the country can be seen as an 
innovator (2015 :38-39) and thus also a forerunner in the adoption of new 
behaviour. Furthermore, there don’t seem to be media companies big enough 
as to argue that most of the World gets their online news from them. The 
“Get news online” category will therefore be changed to “Operating System” 
as the operating system of a device does not only provide the user with a 
digital ecosystem but most operating system have a built-in news functions, 
where the content displayed is controlled by the manufacturer. The five 
categories are therefore as follows: 
 
- Use a messaging application 
- Use a search engine 
- Operating system 
- Buy a product online 
- Social network sites 
 
For each category the two most important companies will be selected. 
Important means primarily the companies with the highest popularity by number 
of countries, the most users worldwide or the company with the biggest 
revenue or political significance. 
 
Use a messaging application: 
With the two most popular messaging applications belonging to Facebook, the 
company becomes the first to be selected in this category. Facebook offers 
a transparency report since 2013. The third place goes to the Rakuten owned 
app “Viber” (Schwartz, J. 2016). Unfortunately, Rakuten does not offer a 
transparency report and the same goes for Tencent with their messaging app 
“WeChat”, that is widely popular in China and beyond. 
 
Use a search engine: 
When it comes to search engines Google has been the market leader for 
some time, steadily holding its global market share above 90% throughout 
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2016. It is followed by the “Bing” search engine from Microsoft (StatCounter 
2016). Both companies regularly publish transparency reports. 
 
Operating system: 
At the End of 2016 Microsoft’s “Windows” operating System was the most 
popular worldwide across all platforms with just below 39% of global market 
share. It was tightly followed by Googles “Android” operating system at 38%. 
As both Google and Microsoft are already on the list of companies with 
transparency reports, a look at the third and fourth place reveals that at the 
end of 2016 Apple had a combined market share of about 18% with its 
operating systems “iOS” and “OS X” for mobile and desktop respectively 
(StatCounter 2016). Apple has also been publishing a transparency report. 
 
Buy a product online: 
According to Global Power of Retailing 2016 report by advisory ´firm Deloitte, 
the list of the Top 50 e-retailers is topped by Amazon and followed by Apple. 
While Amazon does disclose data about government requests it does so in 
detail only for the U.S., not offering individual data on other countries (Amazon 
2017). The third and fourth spot are held by Walmart and JD.com respectively. 
They also do not publish transparency reports on government requests. 
 
Social networking: 
Facebook is the uncontested king of social media with 86% of global market 
share at the end of 2016. It is followed by Pinterest at 7% and Twitter at 4% 
(StatCounter 2016). While Pinterest does offer a transparency report it doesn’t 
receive many requests at all only received 1 foreign request in 2016 and 
2015 (Pinterest 2017). It’s significance to governments is therefore 
questionable. On the other hand, Twitter has proven to be a sensible political 
tool, most notably during the Arab Spring (Huang 2011) and more recently 
through the Tweets by U.S. President Donald Trump (Apps 2016). It can be 
argued that the social media site, despite not being in the top spot in terms 
of market share, is of higher relevancy to this paper. 
 
Fig. 5: Availability of Transparency Reports for 2016 
Category: Messaging Use a Search Engine Operating System Buy a Product Online Social Networking 
Rank 1 Facebook Google Microsoft Amazon Facebook 
Rank 2 Facebook Microsoft Google Apple Pinterest 
Rank 3 Rakuten  Apple Walmart Twitter 








As can be seen in Fig. 5, out of the most important companies in the five 
categories mirroring average Internet use, not all of them provide usable data 
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combined 90% of global browser market share, 94% of operating system 
market share, as well as 90% of global social media market share and most 
of the Messaging market share across all platforms. The only category falling 
short of such high coverage is online shopping, as the e-commerce market is 
globally very diversified and therefore Apple alone cannot be used as a 
representative of all the other players, despite being the second most 
important e-commerce company worldwide (Deloitte 2016: 36-37). Still, in the 
light of this paper focusing on government behaviour rather than potential 
marketing interests of companies, it seems safe to assume that private 
messages and social media behaviour are more relevant to governments than 




Criteria for Data Disclosure 
 
To understand in which cases data is disclosed by companies following a 
request by governments, their individual criteria should be noted: 
 
Figure 6: Company Requirements for Data Disclosure to Governments 
 
 Apple Facebook Google Microsoft Twitter 
Legal basis required X X X X X 
Warrant required X   Sometimes Sometimes 
Company policies relevant   X   
Company opinion relevant X X X  X 
 
 
The criteria for data disclosure by individual companies (Fig. 6), show that 
they tend to be on the customer side, by strongly protecting user rights with 
multiple conditions tied to the disclosure of user data. All require a legal basis 
and sometimes even a warrant, for instance if content data is requested 
(Microsoft, Twitter). Requesting a legal basis means that Companies essentially 
protect their users from misuse of their data by governments (DeNardis / 
Hackl 2015: 5). The reports themselves do not all distinguish between content 
and non-content data types of data. That they don’t is irrelevant for the 
analysis because as established in previous chapters already very little PII in 
combination with today’s technology allows for accurate derivation of a lot 
more than the information that the initial data disclosed. This means that 
even if very little data is shared, data that might not even qualify as PII 
depending on legislation, this data can have far reaching implications as it 
can clearly be attributed to a certain user. The example of Dataselfie showed 
what can be achieved with seemingly harmless data when it is tied to an 
already identified individual.  
 
Furthermore, most of the companies grant themselves discretionary powers. 
While Apple defends its users from potentially hidden intents by rejecting 
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requests with a questionable scope (Apple 2016 [1]: 1), Twitter, for instance, 
reserves itself the right to reject data requests “depending on the nature of 
the underlying crime” (Twitter 2017) and Google states that requests have to 
comply with their own policies in addition to being based on law (Google 
2017). 
 
The high market share of these Internet companies in their respective fields, 
shows that only a few global players control most of the data flow of typical 
Internet behaviour. This means, that if a government wants to know what is 
going on most of the Internet, they must rely on the companies that collect 
it to give them the data. This becomes increasingly relevant as companies 
keep governments at bay, not only with administrative but also technical 
barriers such as encryption (WhatsApp 2017), a growing trend in the tech 
industry that has already had legal consequences (Mott 2016). If their individual 
criteria are not met, the companies don’t disclose any data essentially saying 
“no” to governments 
 
These policies are clearly in favour of the user, but this behaviour shows that, 
in addition to their already vast power in terms of relevancy and market 
share, private companies now also have the power to decide what is good or 
bad. As they are all American companies it is safe to assume that they also 
advocate western values which might be good from a western point of view. 
Different world views however might be put to a disadvantage if the requests 
of some governments are being rejected based on a private company’s view 
of what is acceptable and what is not. This potentially undermines one of the 
central tasks of governments, namely to enforce the rule of law in the country 





The analysis is limited in its level of detail and it aims to depict global trends 
rather than give final answers. Therefore, the amount of government requests 
is added together across all companies to cover the broadest possible 
spectrum. A more profound analysis on individual reports would allow for 
detailed conclusions on individual topics. The Information appearing in the 
reports varies in detail and content from company to company, but the three 
following data sets represent the core information of the transparency reports 
and could be retrieved from all five reports for the whole of 2016.: 
 
Total number of requests by country (see: Appendix Fig. 7): 
The total number of requests refers to the amount of individual times each 
government has requested one or more user data sets from one of the 
companies. These numbers could simply be added together across all half-
yearly reports country by country. The numbers vary strongly between 
countries ranging from 0 total requests to 95031. The average lies at 4040 
requests per country and the median at 15. 
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Total number of accounts referenced (see: Appendix Fig. 8).: 
The total number of accounts referenced refers to the individual people the 
governments have asked data about. These numbers as well could simply be 
added together across all half-yearly reports country by country. Here too, 
the numbers vary strongly between countries ranging from 0 user accounts 
referenced to 188801. The average lies at 6742 user accounts referenced per 
country and the median at 20. 
 
Total percentage of requests where some data was produced (see: Appendix 
Fig. 9): 
Some reports disclose the percentage of request that resulted in the disclosure 
of “some data”. From the percentage of positively answered requests the 
number of positively answered requests could be calculated. Other reports 
directly disclosed how many requests resulted in data disclosure. By adding 
them together and dividing the sum of total requests by the sum of requests 
that where positively answered, the total percentage of requests where some 
data was produced could be calculated (Fig. 9). The average of positively 
answered requests is 28%. Twitter points out that some requests get rejected 
because they refer to inexistent data or because governments didn’t reply to 
further inquiries by the company (2016). As this refers to administrative issues 
when dealing with requests if this happens with requests to Twitter it most 
likely also happens with some requests made to other companies. Most likely 
the amount such administrative rejections does not amount to over two thirds. 
This would be especially questionable, because as one request can refer to 
multiple user accounts, if one account doesn’t exist, data on other accounts 
from the same request might still be disclosed making the request count as 
granted. Again, as the data in the transparency reports is quantitative no 
definite conclusions can be made as to how often this phenomenon occurs.  
 
Of the 65 countries analysed only 73%, or 48 countries, made any requests 
at all. countries that didn’t make any requests were excluded from the 
calculation of as a division by zero is impossible. They will therefore also not 
be included in comparisons involving the data from Fig. 9. Comparisons 
involving the sums of requests or user accounts referenced can include these 
countries, as knowing that a country didn’t make any requests can also prove 
to be useful information. For instance, by combining the total amount of 
requests and user accounts referenced with data on population in every 
country (Source: Internet Live Stats 2016; World Bank 2016), the number of 
requests per capita can be calculated. This discloses which countries request 
the most data from companies relative to their population. Using data on 
online population (see: Appendix Fig. 10) puts the absolute number of requests 
in perspective as countries with a very high population might also make more 
request. Using the number of Internet users in every country instead of general 
population data additionally adjusts for possible variations of internet 
penetration between the countries, regardless of it fluctuating due to 
technology diffusion or because governments make it difficult for users to 
access the internet: 
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Government Requests relative to internet population (see: Appendix Fig. 11): 
On average 6,20 requests for user data were made per 100.000 Internet users. 
The Median is 0,13 requests for user data were per 100.000 Internet users. 
 
User accounts referenced relative to internet population (Fig. 12): 
On average 12,18 user accounts were referenced per per 100.000 Internet 
users. The Median is 8,81 requests per 100.000 Internet users. 
 
As individual values vary strongly between countries for most data sets the 
Median will be more relevant in the upcoming analysis featuring the data from 
the FOTN report. Still, the average can be used which countries rank 
significantly higher than others when looking at the whole bandwidth of 
countries. Only in data sets involving percentages the average can be used 




Learnings of Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
 
While the FOTN report determines the number of countries that will be looked 
at during the analysis, the availability of transparency reports determines 2016 
as the year being studied. It has been shown that the “Violations if User 
Rights” score increases proportionally to the overall Internet freedom score 
and while less free countries also violate user rights more, “Free” countries 
get a majority of their score from user right violations tied to interference 
with the right to privacy. This leads to some exceptions in the linearity of 
proportion between “Violations of user Rights” score and total FOTN score 
that could be of precise relevance when explaining unexpected outcomes of 
“Free” and “Partly Free” countries rating higher than some countries of a 
worse category. A similar but limited relevancy has been attributed to the 
blocking of social media, mainly engaged in by les free countries.  
After establishing the most common actions of Internet behaviour, five relevant 
companies, namely Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter, that best 
represent ordinary global online behaviour, have been selected and the data 
from their transparency reports combined. Together with data on Internet 
population the government requests and user accounts referenced per capita 
could be determined, disclosing which governments use the option to request 
personal data from Internet companies the most. Companies disclose 
information only in less than a third of cases worldwide and decide whether 
they do not only based on a sufficient legal framework but also by applying 
individual requirements for data disclosure. It has therefore been argued that 
a governments ability to enforce the law can be undermined by some of these 
companies as they control and protect significant parts of data flow that 




Online Privacy and Public Policy   Raphael von Aulock 
29 
 
Chapter 4: Analysis 
 
This chapter combines the data of both sources previously established to attempt an answer 
to the research question of this paper. The first hypothesis is based on the results of the 
Freedom on the Net report. It is then falsified by using data from the transparency reports. 
Following the discussion, a second hypothesis that tries to explain the results of the first 
analysis is established and investigated. Again, limits are discussed when they are 
encountered. Finally, the research question is answered in the conclusion of the paper that 




Analysis and Discussion of the First Hypothesis 
 
Based on the Freedom on the Net report, countries with a higher score in 
the "User rights Violation section" interfere more with privacy. As user rights 
violation rises proportionally to the total score, the latter can be used to 
determine which countries are more likely to interfere with user privacy. Based 
on the definition of Privacy and of PII in Chapter 1 requests for user data 
can be asserted to be an attempted interference with privacy. Therefore, 
countries with a higher FOTN score should be more likely to engage in it. 
Based on what was learned about mass surveillance in Chapter 2, it is possible 
that countries that engage in it might be less depending on company requests. 
A similar assumption can be made regarding social media censoring as a 
more difficult accessibility most likely results in less usage of the blocked 
content. Of the seven applications that have been blocked in 2016, all except 
for messaging app Telegram, are owned by companies whose transparency 
report data has flowed into the calculation of user accounts referenced relative 
to online population data. Less usage of these services could mean less need 
for requests. It is therefore arguable that the blocking of social media could 
have some effect on the results. How requests were justified is not disclosed 
in the reports thus limiting social media blocking as a valid explanation. A 
tendency might still be identifiable. 
Combining FOTN data in the form of country scores and data on who has 
blocked social media, with the ranking of countries with the most government 
user accounts referenced per capita and expanded with data on mass 
surveillance capabilities by country, the examination of a first hypothesis is 
made possible: 
 
H1: The governments of countries that have a less free Internet according to 
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Fig 13: Countries by Accounts Referenced per 100.000 Internet Users 






Accounts referenced  





1 Singapore 87,8447   
2 Germany 72,6830 X  
3 United Kingdom 71,5772 X  
4 United States 65,7975 X  
5 France 60,1787   
6 Turkey 33,5543  X 
7 Australia 32,1913 X  
8 Italy 29,2338   
9 Argentinia 17,7702   
10 Estonia 13,3721   
11 Hungary 13,0290   
12 Brazil 12,8351  X 
- Average 8,81 - - 
…     
49 Syria 0 X  
49 Ethiopia 0 X X 
49 Uzbekistan 0 X X 
49 Cuba 0 X X 
49 Vietnam 0 X X 
49 Gambia 0  X 
49 Myanmar 0   
…     





     (full table in the appendix) 
 
The combined data (Fig. 13) shows that unlike expected the ranking is not 
led by “Not Free” countries as the worst possible offenders but that the higher 
ranks, meaning above average, are almost exclusively dominated by “Free” 
countries, with Singapore and Brazil being the only exceptions. As already 
identified earlier, the scores differ in an extreme manner making the median 
a more suitable comparison tool. Still, all “Free” countries except Kenya lie 
above it. 
 
To give an explanation, should the data not mirror the hypothesis, mass 
surveillance and possibly the blocking of social media have been carved out 
as factors that could have an influence. 
 
Free (0-30) 
Partly Free (31-60 
Not Free (61-100) 
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Some countries without any requests (Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, Uzbekistan, 
Vientnam) have surveillance capabilities, meaning that they might not need to 
request data from companies due to them. Countries with surveillance 
capabilities can also be found among the highest-ranking countries (Australia, 
Germany, U.K., U.S.), showing that surveillance capabilities don’t seem to have 
a decisive effect on government requests for user data from private companies. 
 
As the data shows, when it comes to the number of per capita requests, 
“Free” countries, that did not block social media, mostly top the list, while 
less free countries, that have blocked social media in 2016, often have 
considerably less or even no requests at all. The idea of social media as a 
factor of potentially major influence on the frequency of government requests 
is challenged when looking at countries that neither have surveillance 
capabilities nor did they block social media. Those countries would arguably 
have a need for information disclosure by companies as those companies’ 
services are readily available to their populations and they don’t seem to the 
have the technical abilities to get the data on their own. 
 
As could be seen in the case of the recently discovered surveillance 
programmes by the NSA or the surveillance by the Australian government, 
government practices, of interfering with the right to privacy, are sometimes 
hidden. Therefore, it cannot be known which other programs haven’t yet been 
discovered. This means that despite the FOTN report finding that less free 
countries engage more in privacy violation than others, they don’t necessarily 
do so by requesting user data from exactly these companies. While it is 
questionable if all countries that did not have any or many requests engage 
in hidden and undiscovered mass surveillance one possible factor might be 
that people of interest to those governments use less popular services that 
are not covered by this analysis. 
 
The lack of any trend has made it obsolete to exactly check the exceptions 
established based on the “Violations of User Rights” score in Chapter 3. The 
U.K., Italy and France for instance are all among the highest-ranking countries 
in terms of User accounts referenced per capita despite them having a low 
“Violations of User Rights” score.  
 
Summing up it can be said, that governments with a higher FOTN score are 
not more likely to request data from private companies and that neither 
surveillance capabilities nor, the blocking of social media can give a sufficient 
explanation as to why they are not, as no clear trend could be identified. 




Deduction, Analysis and Discussion of the Second Hypothesis. 
 
The question remains as to why many “Free” countries would try to interfere 
with privacy significantly more than most “Partly Free” and “Not Free” countries. 
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The following aspects should be taken into consideration when looking for an 
answer. 
 
Firstly, the significantly higher interference with privacy of many “Free” 
countries, as opposed to their less free coequals, has only been observed in 
the case of government requests to the companies whose reports were 
observed. Other aspects, not covered by this data, have not and cannot be 
considered in this paper. Still, one should bear in mind that these five 
companies account for a majority of typical online behaviour, thus a certain 
relevancy cannot be denied. 
 
Secondly, the interference with privacy the “Free” countries engage in could 
be a justified one. As held on in the UDHR, interference with privacy is 
justifiable if backed by corresponding law. The five companies providing the 
data for this analysis all require sufficient legal justification to consider 
disclosing any data. This means that while many “Free” countries engage in 
interference with privacy by means of user data request more often than many 
countries with a score that is much worse, they might do so in a legal way. 
 
Thirdly, the FOTN report does not include globally justifiable interference with 
privacy. The fact that both Freedom House and all companies providing the 
data used are American, suggests that they are likely to support similar 
notions of what is good or bad. This common ground of morale becomes 
evident the moment it is considered that the FOTN report is financially 
supported by three of the five companies, namely: Google, Facebook and 
Twitter, as they would not endorse a report that contradicts their own views. 
That the companies’ views matter was shown in their criteria for data 
disclosure following government requests. This all means, that legislation that 
is likely to be accepted as legitimate by the companies is also likely to be 
excluded from the FOTN report and therefore not have an impact on the 
score.  
 
For governments to profit from all this, their culture wouldn’t necessarily have 
to be rooted in western culture as the correlation of views is a mere possibility. 
If their policies and practices, follow Freedom House’s notion of what is good 
and bad they should get a lower score on the FOTN report. Then, when 
making requests for user data based on these policies that are unproblematic, 
governments of freer countries should het a higher portion of their requests 
answered positively as opposed to countries that have problematic ones. This 
leads to the following second hypothesis: 
 
H2: The governments of countries that have freer Internet according to the 
Freedom on the Net report, get their requests to private companies for user 
data granted more frequently. 
 






= Average of requests where “some data produced” (28%) 
  /  = “Free” / “Not Free” countries above or below average 
  / /  = Country 
 
 
The combined data of FOTN score and positively answered requests (Fig. 14) 
discloses that the countries group together according to their rating category. 
“Free” countries tend to have an above average percentage of their requests 
answered, while “Not Free countries get little to none answered. “Partly Free” 
countries expectedly occupy the space around the average with only some 
getting none of their requests answered. There are also some exceptions that 
fall out of line (circled in white). Four “Not Free” countries (Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates) are above the five 5% margin of 
appreciation relative to the average of 28% while the results of two “Free” 
countries (Iceland, Kenya) lie more than 5% below it. These exceptions are a 
minority (12%). 
Furthermore, almost all “Free” countries, that ranked above the Median (8,81) 
of user accounts referenced per 100.000 internet users in the first analysis 
(see: Fig. 13) can be found among the countries with an above average 
amount of positively answered requests. Hungary is the only exception. 
The assumption the hypothesis was based upon, namely that free countries 
engage more in government requests because their interferences with privacy 
get legitimized more often, has proven true and therefore the hypothesis itself 

























Percentage of requests where some data produced
Figure 14: Countries by Total FOTN Score in Relation to 
Positively Answered Requests




Fig 15: Country Data on Percentage-, Total- and Per Capita Data and 






Total % of requests 
where some data produced 
Total requests  
for user data 
Requests per  
100.000 internet users 
1 Canada 62% 2130 6,631 
2 Australia 60% 6067 29,338 
3 Argentinia 55% 4152 13,676 
4 Georgia 55% 86 4,086 
5 Armenia 55% 17 1,125 
6 United Kingdom 53% 28673 47,572 
7 Turkey 52% 12940 28,011 
  Majority line (50+%)   
8 Saudi Arabia 50% 154 0,740 
9 France 50% 27295 48,863 
10 Pakistan 45% 1752 5,102 
…     
19 United Arab Emirates 35% 55 0,646 
20 India 35% 21760 4,709 
21 Colombia 34% 755 2,729 
22 Nigeria 33% 11 0,013 
23 Sri Lanka 33% 3 0,049 
24 Italy 33% 7233 18,446 
25 Lebanon 30% 17 0,374 
26 Brazil Average =   28% 8111 5,831 
…     
29 Bangladesh 24% 68 0,32 
29 Hungary 24% 691 8,775 
…     
34 Kenya 17% 4 0,019 
…     
38 Iceland 0% 1 0,301 
…     
38 Tunisia 0% 1 0,018 
38 Uganda 0% 1 0,013 
38 Kazakhstan 0% 1 0,010 
38 Venezuela 0% 1 0,005 





     (full table in the appendix) 
 
Free (0-30) 
Partly Free (31-60 
Not Free (61-100) 
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The low scores of Iceland and Kenya can clearly be attributed to their very 
low number of overall requests (see: Appendix Fig. 15). One factor strongly 
limiting the significance of the data is that 38% (or 18 out of 48) countries, 
including the two exceptions among the “Free” countries, made under twenty 
requests in total (see: Appendix Fig. 15). In these cases, getting only one 
request being granted or rejected results in a variation of the score of at 
least 5%. In the case of six countries (Iceland, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Uganda, 
Egypt, Tunisia) that only made one request the difference was instantly 100% 
to the negative (see: Appendix Fig. 15). These countries, except Iceland, were 
“Partly Free” or not “Free”. The general trend however, remains persistent even 
if these countries were to be excluded from the account. This is mainly 
because out of the seven countries that got a majority (above 50%) of their 
requests granted, six (Canada, Australia, Argentina, Georgia, Armenia, U.K.) 
were rated as “Free” with Turkey being the only exception. These countries 
made above 20 requests, meaning that their scores are comparatively stable. 
 
While relatively clear conclusions can be made on “Free” countries, the same 
cannot be said for the exceptions among “Not Free” countries. The “Not Free” 
countries that got a higher than expected proportion of requests granted all 
had relatively strong positions by having made more than 20 requests (see: 
Appendix Fig. 15). One reason could be that as pointed out in Chapter 3 one 
request can reference multiple accounts the disclosure of information on only 
one account would make a request count as “some data produced”.  
Another explanation could simply be that because a country’s FOTN score 
suggests that it is more likely to engage in unjustifiable interference with 
privacy, it does not mean that it can’t also engage in justified interference. 
While these countries can still engage in problematic behaviour in other 
situations, when it comes to requests to companies they have probably learned 
what works best. To verify this, research combining transparency reports of 
multiple years with the corresponding FOTN reports could provide the 
necessary insights even without knowing what laws where applied as 





















The first hypothesis assumed, that countries that are more likely to engage 
in interference with privacy do so through formal requests for user data to 
private companies. It had to be negated because no trend confirming this was 
evident from the available data. Alternative influencing factors that had 
previously been devised also couldn’t offer an explanation. Further research 
on the topic should be promising is it is arguable that all countries want to 
get some data from somewhere. 
 
The results of the first analysis showed that “Free” countries use the 
opportunity to get data from governments more often. The second hypothesis 
assumed that “Free” countries make so many requests because theirs get 
granted more often. This could be confirmed but had to be put into perspective 
as the extreme fluctuation of requests between countries cannot be plausibly 
explained based on Freedom on the Net data.  
 
In Chapter 2 it was established that government agencies engage in 
surveillance and that some are even capable of bypass encryption. This hasn’t 
kept “Free” countries with these capabilities to indulge in a disproportionally 
high amount of user data inquiries as opposed many less free countries with 
similar capabilities that made no requests at all. As it is arguable that all 
governments have an interest in governing cyberspace to some extent the 
question remains as to where the countries that did not make any requests 
nor had surveillance capabilities get their data from.  
 
The guidelines for data disclosure showed that adequate legislation is possibly 
not the only requirement to get access to user data from companies. 
Combined the they only granted 28% of requests whereas it is unlikely, that 
so many requests simply failed due to administrative complications. While 
things might look different from company to company their global market 
power and their ability to say “no” to governments gives rise to many 
implications ranging from internet governance by companies to the crippling 
of a governments ability to act. 
 
This paper, while lacking to give any final answers due to the limitations by 
data and because of the global approach to the topic, has given impulses for 
a range of further research topics and was ultimately able to confirm its 
research question, determining that there is in fact some interaction between 
the Internet freedom status and how governments engage in user data 
requests.   
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Due to the large number of countries being compared some figures were to large to be displayed or 













































































































































Figure 1: Freedom on the Net 2016 Total Scores




Figure 4: Countries with the Highest Proportion of Their Total Score due to 






Overall FOTN Score 
[Max. 100] 
Violations of User Rights 
Score [Max. 40] 
Percentage of Total 
Score 
1 United States 18 13 72% 
2 United Kingdom 23 16 70% 
3 Iceland 6 4 67% 
4 France 25 16 64% 
5 Australia 21 13 62% 
6 Italy 25 15 60% 
7 Thailand 66 33 59% 
8 Germany 19 11 58% 
9 Canada 16 9 56% 
10 Brazil 32 17 53% 
11 Mexico 38 20 53% 
12 Tunisia 38 20 53% 
13 Morocco 44 23 52% 
14 Egypt 63 33 52% 
15 Singapore 41 21 51% 
16 Ecuador 41 21 51% 
17 Bangladesh 56 28 50% 
18 Estonia 6 3 50% 
19 Japan  22 11 50% 
20 Colombia 32 16 50% 
21 Nigeria 34 17 50% 
22 South Korea 36 18 50% 
23 Ukraine 38 19 50% 
24 India 41 20 49% 
25 Russia 65 32 49% 
26 Bahrain 71 34 48% 
27 Kenya 29 14 48% 
28 Angola 40 19 48% 
29 Armenia 30 14 47% 
30 United Arab Emirates 68 32 47% 
31 Saudi Arabia 72 34 47% 
32 Sudan  64 30 47% 
33 Philippines 26 12 46% 
34 Zimbabwe 56 25 45% 
35 Pakistan 69 31 45% 
36 Vietnam 76 34 45% 
37 China 88 40 45% 
38 Zambia 38 17 45% 
39 Belarus 62 28 45% 
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40 Georgia 25 11 44% 
41 Malaysia 45 20 44% 
42 Turkey 61 27 44% 
43 South Africa 25 11 44% 
44 Argentinia 27 12 44% 
45 Hungary 27 12 44% 
46 Lebanon 45 20 44% 
47 Myanmar 61 27 44% 
48 Uganda 42 18 43% 
49 Indonesia 44 19 43% 
50 Jordan 51 22 43% 
51 Iran 87 37 43% 
52 Libya 58 25 43% 
53 Syria 87 37 43% 
54 Cambodia 52 22 42% 
55 Azerbaijan 57 24 42% 
56 Venezuela 60 25 42% 
57 Kazakhstan 63 26 41% 
58 Cuba 79 32 41% 
59 Sri Lanka 44 18 41% 
60 Gambia 67 27 40% 
61 Kyrgyzstan 35 14 40% 
62 Uzbekistan 79 31 39% 
63 Ethiopia 83 32 39% 
64 Rwanda 51 20 39% 
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Figure 7: Total Requests for User Data
Average: 4040     Median: 77













































































































































Figure 8: Total User Accounts Referenced
Average: 6742     Median: 20











































































































Figure 9: Total Percentage of Requests Where Some Data Produced
Average: 28%
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Figure 10: Country Data on Population, Online Population and Internet 








% of Internet 
 penetration 
Angola 28.813.000 5.951.453 23% 
Argentinia 43.847.000 30.359.855 69% 
Armenia 2.925.000 1.510.906 50% 
Australia 24.127.000 20.679.490 85% 
Azerbaijan 9.762.000 6.027.647 61% 
Bahrain 1.425.000 1.278.752 92% 
Bangladesh 162.952.000 21.439.070 13% 
Belarus 9.507.000 5.786.572 61% 
Brazil 207.653.000 139.111.185 66% 
Cambodia 15.762.000 1.756.824 11% 
Canada 36.286.000 32.120.519 89% 
China 1.378.665.000 721.434.547 52% 
Colombia 48.653.000 27.664.747 57% 
Cuba 11.476.000 3.696.765 32% 
Ecuador 16.385.000 7.055.575 43% 
Egypt 95.689.000 30.835.256 33% 
Estonia 1.316.000 1.196.521 91% 
Ethiopia 102.403.000 4.288.023 4% 
France 66.896.000 55.860.330 86% 
Gambia 2.039.000 346.471 17% 
Georgia 3.719.000 2.104.906 53% 
Germany 82.668.000 71.016.605 88% 
Hungary 9.818.000 7.874.733 80% 
Iceland 334.000 331.778 100% 
India 1.324.171.000 462.124.989 35% 
Indonesia 261.115.000 53.236.719 20% 
Iran 80.277.000 39.149.103 49% 
Italy 60.601.000 39.211.518 66% 
Japan 126.995.000 115.111.595 91% 
Jordan 9.456.000 3.536.871 46% 
Kazakhstan 17.797.000 9.961.519 56% 
Kenya 48.462.000 21.248.977 45% 
Kyrgyzstan 6.083.000 2.076.200 34% 
Lebanon 6.007.000 4.545.007 76% 
Libya 6.293.000 1.335.705 21% 
Malawi 18.092.000 1.160.839 7% 
Malaysia 31.817.000 21.090.777 69% 
Mexico 127.540.000 58.016.997 45% 
Morocco 36.286.000 2.068.556 58% 
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Myanmar 52.885.000 1.353.649 3% 
Nigeria 185.990.000 86.213.365 46% 
Pakistan 193.203.000 34.342.400 18% 
Philippines 103.320.000 44.478.808 44% 
Russia 144.342.000 102.258.256 71% 
Rwanda 11.918.000 1.478.216 12% 
Saudi Arabia 32.276.000 20.813.695 65% 
Singapore 5.607.000 4.699.204 83% 
South Africa 55.909.000 28.580.290 52% 
South Korea 51.246.000 43.274.132 86% 
Sri Lanka 21.203.000 6.087.164 30% 
Sudan 39.579.000 10.886.813 26% 
Syria 18.430.000 5.502.250 30% 
Thailand 66.864.000 29.078.158 43% 
Tunisia 11.403.000 5.472.618 48% 
Turkey 79.512.000 46.196.720 58% 
Uganda 41.488.000 7.645.197 19% 
Ukraine 45.005.000 19.678.089 44% 
United Arab Emirates 9.270.000 8.515.420 92% 
United Kingdom 65.637.000 60.273.385 93% 
United States 323.128.000 286.942.362 89% 
Uzbekistan 31.848.000 15.453.227 51% 
Venezuela 31.568.000 18.254.349 58% 
Vietnam 31.568.000 49.063.762 52% 
Zambia 16.591.000 3.167.934 19% 
Zimbabwe 16.150.000 3.356.223 21% 
Average - - 51% 
 














































































































































Figure 11: Combined Amount of Government Requests for User Data 
per 100.000 Internet users
Average: 6,20     Median: 0,13













































































































































Figure 12: Combined amount of User accounts Referenced by 
Governments per 100.000 Internet Users 
Average: 12,18     Median: 8,81




Fig 13: Countries by Accounts Referenced per 100.000 Internet Users in 






Accounts Referenced  





1 Singapore 87,8447     
2 Germany 72,6830 X   
3 United Kingdom 71,5772 X   
4 United States 65,7975 X   
5 France 60,1787     
6 Turkey 33,5543   X 
7 Australia 32,1913 X   
8 Italy 29,2338     
9 Argentinia 17,7702     
10 Estonia 13,3721     
11 Hungary 13,0290     
12 Brazil 12,8351   X 
- Average 8,81 -   - 
13 Canada 8,7825     
14 Pakistan 7,3757   X 
15 India 7,3073 X   
16 Mexico 6,0413     
17 South Korea 5,7240     
18 Georgia 5,3684   X 
19 Colombia 4,5618     
20 Jordan 3,6190   X 
21 Japan  3,3889     
22 Ecuador 2,1827     
23 Armenia 1,4561   X 
24 Saudi Arabia 1,1435 X X 
-   
1 Request per 100.000 Internet 
Users     
25 China 0,9348 X X 
26 Russia 0,7246 X   
27 
United Arab 
Emirates 0,7046 X X 
28 Lebanon 0,4400     
29 Bangladesh 0,3825 X X 
30 Ukraine 0,3608     
31 Malaysia 0,3509   X 
32 Bahrain 0,3128 X X 
33 Iceland 0,3014     
34 Azerbaijan 0,1991     
35 Indonesia 0,1446   X 
36 Belarus 0,1383 X   
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37 Sudan  0,1194 X   
38 Thailand 0,0722     
39 South Africa 0,0525     
40 Sri Lanka 0,0493     
41 Philippines 0,0382     
- Median 0,3 -  - 
42 Kenya 0,0282     
43 Nigeria 0,0209     
44 Tunisia 0,0183     
45 Uganda 0,0131   X 
46 Kazakhstan 0,0100   X 
47 Venezuela 0,0055     
48 Egypt 0,0032   X 
49 Iran 0   X 
49 Syria 0 X   
49 Ethiopia 0 X X 
49 Uzbekistan 0 X X 
49 Cuba 0 X X 
49 Vietnam 0 X X 
49 Gambia 0   X 
49 Myanmar 0     
49 Libya 0     
49 Zimbabwe 0   X 
49 Cambodia 0     
49 Rwanda 0     
49 Morocco 0   X 
49 Malawi 0     
49 Angola 0     
49 Zambia 0     
49 Kyrgyzstan 0     
 
Background legend: 
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Fig 15: Country Data on Percentage-, Total- and Per Capita Data and on 
Government Requests   





Total % of Requests 
 Where Some Data Produced 
Total Requests  
for User Data 
Requests per  
100.000 Internet Users 
1 Canada 62% 2130 6,631 
2 Australia 60% 6067 29,338 
3 Argentinia 55% 4152 13,676 
4 Georgia 55% 86 4,086 
5 Armenia 55% 17 1,125 
6 United Kingdom 53% 28673 47,572 
7 Turkey 52% 12940 28,011 
  Majority line (50+%)   
8 Saudi Arabia 50% 154 0,740 
9 France 50% 27295 48,863 
10 Pakistan 45% 1752 5,102 
11 Japan  45% 2730 2,372 
12 Estonia 45% 111 9,277 
13 Ecuador 44% 111 1,573 
14 Mexico 42% 2123 3,659 
15 Singapore 40% 3245 69,054 
16 United States 40% 95031 33,118 
17 Germany 38% 35291 49,694 
18 Malaysia 38% 50 0,237 
19 United Arab Emirates 35% 55 0,646 
20 India 35% 21760 4,709 
21 Colombia 34% 755 2,729 
22 Nigeria 33% 11 0,013 
23 Sri Lanka 33% 3 0,049 
24 Italy 33% 7233 18,446 
25 Lebanon 30% 17 0,374 
26 Brazil Average =   28% 8111 5,831 
27 South Africa 27% 12 0,042 
28 Bangladesh 24% 68 0,317 
29 Hungary 24% 691 8,775 
30 Philippines 24% 14 0,031 
31 South Korea 22% 1140 2,634 
32 Indonesia 21% 58 0,109 
33 Jordan 20% 93 2,629 
34 Kenya 17% 4 0,019 
35 Ukraine 14% 25 0,127 
36 Russia 7% 489 0,478 
37 China 1% 56 0,008 
38 Belarus 0% 3 0,052 
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38 Bahrain 0% 4 0,313 
38 Iceland 0% 1 0,301 
38 Azerbaijan 0% 10 0,166 
38 Sudan  0% 12 0,110 
38 Thailand 0% 15 0,052 
38 Tunisia 0% 1 0,018 
38 Uganda 0% 1 0,013 
38 Kazakhstan 0% 1 0,010 
38 Venezuela 0% 1 0,005 
38 Egypt 0% 1 0,003 
 Morocco   0 0,000 
 Angola   0 0,000 
 Zimbabwe   0 0,000 
 Vietnam   0 0,000 
 Zambia   0 0,000 
 Myanmar   0 0,000 
 Iran   0 0,000 
 Libya   0 0,000 
 Syria   0 0,000 
 Cambodia   0 0,000 
 Cuba   0 0,000 
 Gambia   0 0,000 
 Kyrgyzstan   0 0,000 
 Uzbekistan   0 0,000 
 Ethiopia   0 0,000 
 Rwanda   0 0,000 
 Malawi   0 0,000 
 Average 28% 4040 6,2 
 Median - 77 0,13 
 
Legend: 
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